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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CRO\,VN ROOFING AND ENGINEERING
CO:MP ANY,
dba
ROOFERS S U P P L Y COMP ANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

STANLEY D. ROBINSON, dba
RELIABLE ROOFING COMP ANY, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents,

Case No.
10723

OLYMPIC CONSTRUCTION
COMP ANY, INC.,
Intervenor.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by a materialman brought under
the provisions of 14-2-2 of the Utah Code Annotated
195:3, against the owners because of the failure of the
owners to obtain a bond from their contractor.

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The case was tried without a jury on the 22nd
day of June, 1966, and the court found that the statute
of limitations applicable to the statute was one year
and that the supplier was barred by the statute of limitations as to all of the owners but one and that it failed
to qualify itself as a materialman under the statute
as to the one.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment and an
order remanding the case back for re-trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The action was brought by the plaintiff against
the defendant Stanley D. Robinson, the sub-contractor
who became bankrupt and some twenty-five owners of
homes built by the Olympic Construction Company,
for the reasonable value of roofing materials furnished
by the plaintiff between January and October, 1964.
The Olympic Construction Company intervened and
offered to accept liability for the respective owners. All
of the essential elements under 14-2-2 of the statute
were admitted except the qualification of the plaintiff
as a materialman and the reasonable value of the ma·
terials.
The court found that the one year statute of limitations barred all of the actions except one, paragraph
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an<l as to that one that the plaintiff did not furnish
materials under the contract, (Tr. 113). Or, as set out
m paragraphs 1 and 2 of the conclusions of law on
i:-lage 105 of the record, the plaintiffs claim against all
of the defendants except Youngberg is barred by reason
of the one-year statute of limitations found at 78-1229 ( 2) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that with
respect to the built up roofs, of which Youngberg was
one, the plaintiff was not a materialman furnishing
material under the contract as contemplated by Title
U, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Four of
the homes were shingled and the others were gravel,
or built up roofs.
:23,

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE
ONE YEAR STATUTE.
This is an action created by statute. The three year
limitation found at 78-12-26 ( 4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, should have been applied. If the intention
of the legislature had been otherwise there would have
been no need for the 1965 legislature to have amended
the statute so as to give it a present one year limitation.
The one year statute, as provided in 78-12-29 (2)
applies only when there is a penalty or forfeiture, which
is not the case here.
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The remedy given by 14-2-2 is purely compel!satory, and is considered by the authorities to be a liability created by statute and not a fine or a penalty.
23 A. J. at page 625, paragraph 29:

"A statutory obligation to pay damages which
the common law does not give is a liability created by statute, and not a penalty, where the
damages awarded are strictly compensatory.''
The decision in the case of John H. Slater v.
Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Fy. Co., 137 P 943,
discusses the question quite fully citing many cases
and holds that the three year statute should apply. At
page 953:
"The trial court held this action barred by the
one year statute. The judgment was reversed,
and it was held that the action was upon 'a liability created by statute' and not an action for n
penalty or forfeiture."
The case of Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657,
makes the following distinction:
"The question whether a statute of one state,
which in some respects may be called penal, is
a penal law in the international sense, so that it
cannot be enforced in the courts of another state.
depends upon the question. whether its .purp~se
is to punish an offense agamst the pubhc policy
of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a
person injured by the wrongful act."
The remedy provided by 14-2-2 of the Utah Code
is purely compensatory. It is in no sense a "forfeiture
or penalty." The three year statute should apply.
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POINT II.
PLAINTIFF WAS A l\tlATERIALMAN
FllRNISHING MATERIALS UNDER THE
CONTRACT.
The court erred m finding that the plaintiff was
not a materialman furnishing materials under the contract on the built up roofs.
The evidence shows by a great preponderance
that the plaintiff furnished all of the felt used on the
built up roofs.
The testimony of Charles Robinson taken from
page 55 of the transcript, commencing with line 24, is
as follows:
"I have checked with Stanley Robinson many
times, and I know that his felts were purchased
at my place of business."
and from page 56, line 26:
"At the time Mr. Robinson took this contract
on, and entered into the contract, he came to me
to purchase the material, and he agreed that he
would buy all his material from me, if I would
go along on the job.
Question: Did you do that? Answer: Yes."
The plaintiff offered to make the proof positive
that no felt was purchased for the built up roofs on
these houses from any other source and was refused (Tr.
ll3, line 1).
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CONCLUSION
The court erred in applying the one year statute
of limitations and in finding that the plaintiff did not
furnish materials on the built up roofs under the contract. The case should be remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HORACE J. KNOWLTON
214 Tenth Avenue

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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